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NOTES
BANKRUPTCY-CLAIMS FOR FUTURE RENT-LEASES.-Probably no
legal subject has been the object of as much judicial comment and
critical discussion as has the matter of future rent claims in bankruptcy. This abundance of comment is, of course, in direct relation to the
importance of the subject, especially in times when bankruptcies, due
to economic conditions, are numerous. The amount of money which
may be involved in claims for future rent against but one bankrupt
estate can be enormous,1 while the aggregate of such claims in all
bankruptcies reaches astounding proportions.
The direct question of whether or not claims for future rent should
be allowed in bankruptcy proceedings cannot be answered categorically
because the answer thereto involves the interests of three widely diver1 See an article by John A. Seiff in 9 Am. Bankr. Rev. 342 entitled, "The
Recent Chain Store Bankruptcies."
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gent groups, all of whom must be protected in order that the broad purposes of the Bankruptcy Act may be effectuated. First, there is the
bankrupt person or corporation whom the law seeks to rehabilitate;
secondly, there is the landlord claimant; and, lastly, there are the
other creditors who have a right to share in the assets. Theoretically,
the interest of the bankrupt should favor the provability of all claims
in order that they might therefore be eligible for discharge, but actually, in the case of corporate bankrupts at least, their interest favor nonprovability.
The interests of the second and third groups are in direct conflict.
When a creditor's share of the assets is in inverse ratio to the number
and amount of other claims it naturally follows that said creditor
wants as little company as possible when the final distribution of assets is made. This opposition of interest is heightened as between
merchandise creditors whose goods make up the tangible assets of the
estate and landlords who can trace their claim to no specific assets
from which their claim should be paid. No attempt will be made here
to decide the equities of the situation or to discuss the general subject of provability of claims for future rent.2 The purpose of this note
2 Future rent claims are contingent and thus, generally, are not provable
under section 63a of the Bankruptcy Act. Section 63b provides only for claims
otherwise provable under 63a. Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U. S. 340, 23 S. Ct. 757
(1903). But see Maynard v. Elliott, 283 U. S. 273, 51 S. Ct. 390 (1931); and see
judge Learned Hand's interpretation of the Maynard case in Manhattan Properties, Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 66 Fed. (2d) 470 (C. C. A. 2nd. 1933).
For a history of bankruptcy legislation on contingent and unliquidated claims
in England and the United States see 33 Col. L. Rev. 217, footnotes 17 and 18.
The following general rules, as stated in 5 Ind. L. Jour. 626, help to explain
the situation of a lessor when his lessee becomes bankrupt: "1. If the bankrupt
is a tenant of the leased premises his interest in the expired term of the lease
will constitute assets of the estate in bankruptcy and pass t6 the trustee. (Except
against the exercise of a right of re-entry reserved.) 2. The trustee is not
bound to assume a lease made to the bankrupt unless he thinks it will be for
the benefit of the creditors; he has an option to accept or abandon it, but the
option must be exercised, title not passing automatically. 3. A lessee's covenant not to assign, mortgage or pledge the lease or underlet the property without the lessor's consent is not violated by the lessee's bankruptcy." Cases are
cited in support of each rule. To these rules may be added some generalities of
lease law: (1) Dissolution of a corporation does not. terminate a lease (Cummington Realty Associates v. Whitten, 239 Mass. 313, 132 N. E. 53, 17 A. L. R. 532
(1921)); (2) Rent is paid not for the grant but for the use of the premiss
(Fifth Avenue Bldg. Co. v. Kernochan, 221 N. Y. 370, 117 N. E. 579 (1917));
(3) A landlord who re-enters the premises without the right reserved terminates
the lease and can have no claim for future rent (South Side Trust Co. v. Watson,
200 Fed. 50, 118 C. C. A. 278 (1912)).
For interpretations of Section 74 (a), as added to by Act of Mar. 3, 1933,
c. 204 § 1, 47 Stat. 1467, 11 USCA § 202 (a), see Manhattan Properties v. Irving
Trust Co., 54 S. Ct. 385 (1934) (holding that this section applies only to individuals), and In re Brooks Sample Furniture Co., 4 Fed. Supp. 858 (D. C. D.
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is to collate the types of leases or covenants in leases which have been
drawn to circumvent the general rule that claims for future rent are
3
not provable in bankruptcy proceedings.
The importance of anticipating the contingency of a tenant's bankruptcy and providing therefor is borne out by the recent wholesale
use of bankruptcy by tenants to avoid costly leases. 4 In fact the courts
have judicially recognized that few creditors of a corporation with non5
provable claims have ever collected anything after bankruptcy.
A lease containing no covenants providing for the tenant's bankruptcy affords a landlord no protection. All the historic objections to
the effect that the peculiar nature of the obligation to pay rent is
contingent makes his claim nonprovable.6 Nor do bankruptcy proceedings constitute an anticipatory breach of a covenant to pay rent 7
though such proceedings have been held to constitfite an anticipatory
breach of other executory contracts. 8 The basis for the distinction is
the oft-quoted "diversity between duties which touch the realty and
the mere personality." 1 The application of this anachronistic doctrine has been criticized 10 and some courts have refused to follow
it;11 yet it still is applied in the majority of cases. It has been suggested that the case of In re Marshall's Garage12 shows that the
Conn., 1933) (holding that claims for future rent are made provable only for
purpose of extension proposal provided for by such section). See, also 9 Notre
Dame Lawy. 291, at 301.
3 See 33 Col. L. Rev. 241, for a discussion of covenants in leases that seek
to provide for a breach by bankruptcy, especially note 144, at page 246, containing suggested covenants.
4 Though it is true that because ordinarily bankruptcy proceedings do not
ipso facto terminate a lease, and since nonprovable claims are not discharged the
landlord is not theoretically injured, yet in the case of corporate lessees bank-

ruptcy is usually accompanied by dissolution or reorganization so that by the
time the landlord matures his claim he is unable to reach any of the assets. 43
Yale L. Jour. 1007. See 7 Univ. of Cin. L. Rev. 165, note 15, for a partial list of
corporations that have recently gone into bankruptcy because of lease situations.
5 In re Portage Rubber Co., 296 Fed. 289, certiorari denied, 45 S. Ct. 91
(1924).
6 Colman Co. v. Withoft, 195 Fed. 250, 115 C. C. A. 222 (1912); Watson v.
Merrill, 136 Fed. 359, 69 C. C. A. 185, 69 A. L. R. 719 (1905).
7 Wells v. 21st Street Realty Co., 12 Fed. (2d) 2X7 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926).
This is qualified to be the rule only in states where the common law applies. In
re Goldberg, 52 Fed. (2d) 156 (S. D. N. Y., 1931).
8 Central Trust Co. of Illinois v. Chicago Auditorium Association, 240 U. S.
581, 36 S. Ct. 412, (1916).
9 Co. Litt. 292b § 513.
10 42 Yale L. Jour. 1004, note 6. See concurring opinion of Judge Learned
Hand in In re Metropolitan Chain Stores, 66 Fed. (2d) 487 (C. D. A. 2nd, 1933).
11 In re Bissinger, 5 Fed. (2d) 106 (N. D. Ohio, 1925); Wilson v. National
Refining-Co., 126 Kan. 139, 266 Pac. 941 (1928).
12 63 Fed. (2d) 759 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1933).
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courts will not apply the above dictum of Coke to all contracts involving real property but only to such contracts that involve the peculiar
obligation of paying rent."3 In that case the court allowed proof of a
claim for the breach of a covenant to purchase the property.
The natural result of such holdings, plus dicta in certain cases 14
to the effect that parties to a lease might by some kind of an agreement make future rent claims provable, has been numerous attempts
by lawyers to draw up covenants which will obviate any of the standard objections. Their efforts have met with varying degrees of success
depending on the ingenuity of counsel and the Federal district court
having jurisdiction of the case. Until very recently, however, most of
these attempts have been over-thrown by the courts.
Two of the most frequently used covenants are those calling for
indemnity against loss of rent and those accelerating future rent in
the event of default. The purpose of such covenants is to disguise a
rent claim as one for damages for the breach of some contract other
than one for rent. In In re Roth & Appel 15 the covenant provided
that "In case the lessee is declared bankrupt, the lease shall terminate
and the lessor has a right to re-enter, in which case the lessee agrees
... [to] pay . . . on the first day of each month, as upon rent days,
the difference between the rents and sums reserved ... and those otherwise reserved or with due diligence collectible, on account of rents of
the demised premises for the preceding month, up to the end of the
term remaining at the time of the entry." A claim filed under this provision was disallowed, the court holding it to be contingent because:
(1) It was uncertain whether the lessor would re-enter and terminate
the lease; and (2) If the lease was terminated it was uncertain whether there would be any loss in rents. The court clearly stated that the
question was not whether rent to accrue in the future is provable
against a bankrupt estate, but whether a claim founded on an agreement to indemnify a landlord for loss of rents following the bankruptcy
is provable. This case is still the leading case on the subject and any
1
of the infirmities in the above covenant must be expressly avoided.
The first objection can be precluded by providing that the tenant's
bankruptcy terminate the lease absolutely; any claim for future rent
then ceases but the lessee is entitled to damages for the breach of the
13 1 Chicago L. Rev. 341.
Especially in In re Roth & Appel, 181 Fed. 667, 31 A. L. R. (N. S.) 270
(C. C. A. 2nd, 1910).
14
15

Op. cit. supra note 14.

16 In re Brooks Sample Furniture Co., op. cit. supra note 2; In re United
Cigar Stores Co. of America, 4 Fed. Supp. 859 (D. C. S. D. N. Y., 1933).
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lease. This claim is not contingent but arises simultaneously
with and
17
is absolutely owing at the time of filing the petition.
The case of In re Metropolitan Chain Stores 18 was decided on the
authority of the second objection given in the Roth & Appel case.
There, though the breach had occurred before the term was to begin,
the court held the damages too speculative to constitute a provable
claim. This objection will be considered briefly in a subsequent part
of this note when the matter of liquidating future rents will be discussed.
In In re Rite's Colthes 19 the covenants of the lease provided for
its termination upon the happening of certain conditions but contained
no provision for damages. The lessor exercised his right to re-enter
because of a breach by the lessee. Later, upon bankruptcy proceedings
being filed against the lessee, the lessor attempted to prove a claim for
future rent. This was denied on the ground that the landlord having
terminated the lease his right to rent was gone. This case is an example of what, for bankruptcy purposes at least, is a poorly drawn
lease. From it we may conclude that a claim for damages must be reserved in the lease itself.
A lessee's covenant that "it will indemnify the Lessor against all
loss of rent which the Lessor may incur by reason of such termination [by bankruptcy], during the residue of the term" is not sufficient
to give the lessor a provable claim. It was so held in Brown v. Irving
Trust Co. 20 How much will ever be due is not readily ascertainable.
As the court said: ".

.

. we cannot recast the words to make them

over into a liquidation of damages in the case of bankruptcy. Possibly
the full intent was not expressed; if so, the loss must fall upon the
lessor, who presumably drafted it."

21

17 In re Pettingill and Co., i37 Fed. 143 (1905); In re Swift, 112 Fed. 313
(1901); Taylor Trust v. Kothe, 30 Fed. (2d) 77 (C. C. A. 1st, 1929) (Reversed
under name of Kothe v. Taylor Trust, go S. Ct. 142, on different grounds). The
foregoing statement, which these cases are quoted as supporting, applies to
claims for liquidated damages as provided for in the lease and not to a claim
for rent. This may sound like Tweedledum and Tweedledee, but the distinctori
is, nevertheless, important.
18
66 Fed. (2d) 482 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1933) (Certiorari granted but dismissed
on motion of counsel for petitioner, 54 S.Ct. 130, 207). Contra, In re National
Credit Clothing Co., 66 Fed. (2d) 371 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933), on the grounds that
the breach occurred prior to the filing of the petition.
19 49 Fed. (2d) 393 (D.C. S. D. N. Y., 1931).
20 66 Fed. (2d) 473, (C. C. A. 2nd, 1933).
21 The leading case of In re Service Appliance Co., 39 Fed. (2d) 632 (D. C.
N. D. N. Y., 1930), is of little value to this discussion for the lease involved
contained no provision for bankruptcy. Similarly, In re McAllister-Mobler Co.,
46 Fed. (2d) 91 (D. C. S. D. Ohio, 1930), except for the dictum that the landlord could have protected himself by appropriate covenants.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
Kothe v. Taylor Trust 22 involved a lease containing an acceleration clause. By the terms of the lease the filing of any proceedings in
bankruptcy against the tenant constituted a breach of the lease whereupon the lease was to terminate and the lessor was to recover damages
for such breach "equal to the amount of the rent reserved in this
lease for the residue of the term." The Circuit Court of Appeals held
this claim provable in that it was not contingent but for a definite
sum then due and owing. The Supreme Court reversed this holding on
the grounds that such damages were unreasonable and constituted an
unenforceable penalty. The court did not discuss the adequacy of such
a provision as a basis for a claim by a landlord but confined itself
entirely to the amount of damages involved. This illustrates one of the
dangers to be provided against in drawing this type of covenant. It is
true, however, that it is only when such damages are grossly excessive
that they are considered penalties. Thus, properly drawn, an acceleration clause may be used as a measure of damages. It may be well to
point out here that some form of liquidated damages must be provided for as being immediately due and owing not only because of the
bankruptcy law but because of such decisions as Hermitage Co. v.
Levine 23 and Hand v. Rifkin 24 to the effect that the loss which the
landlord may suffer through the tenant's default cannot be ascertained
until the end of the term denominated in the lease.
In the case of In re United Cigar Stores Co. of America 25 a
was filed under a covenant in a lease which stipulated that the
lord confessed judgment for the rent reserved for the whole
"with stay of judgment until the several days of payment . .

claim
landterm
. and
judgment may be entered for all rent in arrears." This was in addition to a clause allowing the lessor, at his option, to terminate the
lease upon the bankruptcy of the lessee. The latter clause, of course,
fell before the authority of the Roth & Appel case even though the
property was situated in Pennsylvania, where the claimant contended
a different rule applied. The claim based on the confessed judgment
was also denied because other provisions for part payment of rent
and the stay of execution until the several days of payment made it
apparent that the parties did not consider the rent for the entire term
payable in advance. Conceding that this clause could be construed as
being exactly what it purported to be, however, the court held that
the landlord could not prove a claim for the entire rent "without conceding that the leasehold was an asset of the bankrupt estate to be
enjoyed free from further claims for rent"; that, further, the landlord
22

Op. cit. supra note 17.

23
24

248 N. Y. 333, 162 N. E. 97, 59 A. L. R. 1013 (1928).
189 N. E. 476 (N. Y. 1934).

25

Op. cit. supra note 16.
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by re-entering and keeping the rentals from the new tenant did not
intend to make such a concession.
From the foregoing case it may be argued that in states where
such a clause in a lease is valid a landlord may prove his claim for
rent thereunder if he wishes to give up his premises to the trustee for
the remainder of the term. The right to prove a claim under such
circumstances might or might not be of value. Many factors, unforseeable at the time the lease is made, such as the size of the fund
available for distribution, the length of the remainder of the term,
and general economic conditions, would determine the efficacy of such
a provision from the landlord's viewpoint. Then, too, the case does
not determine whether under such a provision the landlord would be
bound to surrender his lease to the trustee and be relegated to the
sole remedy of proving his claim under the confessed judgment.
As indicated in the United Cigar Store case, the courts will not
allow the landlord to "eat his cake and have it." In fact in in; re
Barnett 26 the court held that in Pennsylvania if the lessor accepts a
surrender of a lease upon the bankruptcy of a tenant all unmatured
claims are terminated, including a claim based upon an acceleration
clause in the lease. If he chooses not to accept the surrender he can
prove only as a general creditor. This, however, does not mean that
a landlord is not entitled to be indemnified for any loss resulting from
the breach if he has provided for such indemnity in his lease, but it
does mean that his claim will be limited as strictly as possible to indemnity alone.
In a number of instances the claims have been allowed. In the case
of In re National Credit Clothing Co. 2 7 the fact that the breach of
the lease occurred before the filing of bankruptcy proceedings and that
under a covenant in the lease a valid claim for damages existed influenced the court to allow the claim. The computation of the amount
due was not considered as too difficult or too dependent upon contingencies to make the claim provable. In In re Mullings 28 the claim
26

12 Fed. (2d) 73 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1926). See also In re Herrick, 200 Fed.

50 (1912).

27 Op. cit. supra note 18. The third and the seventh circuits have usually
held such claims provable. This must be borne in mind when drafting covenants
to be used in other circuits.
28 238 Fed. 58 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1916). See, also, Kalkhoff v. Nelson, 60 Minn.
284, 62 N. W. 332 (1895).

The case of Filene's Sons Co. v. Weed, 245 U. S. 597, 38 S. Ct. 211 (1918),
is also interesting in this connection, though not strictly in point being a receivership action. The covenants in the lease are too long and involved to quote
here. They provided in substance, for a payment upon breach in certain named
ways, including bankruptcy, of twenty thousand dollars a year for the remainder of the term. This was in addition to the covenant providing for an
annual rental at the same sum. The court allowed the claim since it was "not

for rent at all but was a personal covenant that liquidated the damages."
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was also allowed, receivership proceedings prior to the bankruptcy
being held to constitute a sufficient breach to give rise to a provable
cause of action. The fact that the bankrupt was a corporation about
to be dissolved also influenced this case. The lease involved in In re
Pittsburg Drug Co. 2 9 provided that in case "bankruptcy proceedings
be begun by or against said lessee . . . or a receiver appointed, the
entire balance of the term of the lease . . . shall thereupon become
due and payable. . ." A receiver for the lessee was first appointed, followed by bankruptcy. The landlord's claim was allowed in the bankruptcy proceedings, but the prior receivership was held to have made
the sum claimed fall due so that it was "a fixed liability absolutely
o~ving at the time of filing of the bankruptcy petition." 30
One of the best ways of showing how one kind of a covenant in a
lease will allow a landlord to prove a claim for future rent while another will fail of its objective is to compare .the two recent cases of
In re Outfitters' Operating Realty Co.31 and Manhattan Properties
Inc. v. Irving Trust Co. 3 2 In the latter case two leases were involved.
The first lease contained a covenant that if bankruptcy proceedings
should be instituted by or against the tenant, the landlord might without notice re-enter the premises; and, after obtaining possession, relet
as agent for the tenant, for the whole or any part of the term, and
"The tenant agrees to pay each month to the landlord the deficit accruing from the difference between the amount to be paid as rent as
herein reserved and the amount of rent which shall be collected and
received from the demised premises for such month during the residue
of the term herein provided for after the taking possession -by the
landlord ... " There was a further provision authorizing the landlord, after breach by the tenant, to release the tenant from all further
obligations upon which neither landlord nor tenant were to have any
further rights under the lease. The other lease was similar, providing
that after breach by bankruptcy ". . . the Lessee .. .will indemnify
the Lessor against all loss of rent which the Lessor may incur by reason. of such termination, during the residue of the term... " Claims
164 Fed. 482 (D. C. W. D.
29
Fed. 584 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1919), and
for a special form of lease drawn
rent claims.
30 In In re Schecter, 39 Fed.

Pa., 1908). See, also, Rosenblum v. Uber, 256
Wilson v. Pa. Trust Co., 114 Fed. 742 (1902),
to take advantage of a local statute allowing
(2d) 18 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1930), the lease read:

"If at any time proceedings in( bankruptcy shall be instituted by or against the

lessee then the rent for the balance of the term shall become due and payable
as if by the terms of the lease it were payable in advance." Held, The liability
of the tenant for the accelerated rent was fixed and absolute at the time of the
petition and the claim could be proved. See, also, In re Chakos, 24 Fed. (2d)
482 (C. C. A. 7th, 1928). See note 27, supra.
31 69 Fed. (2d) 90 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1934).
32 54 S. Ct. 385 (1934).
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under both leases were held not provable because: (1) The lessor had
a choice of whether or not to terminate the lease; and (2) ". . . the
landlord does not rely upon the destruction of his contract by bankruptcy; 'he initiates a new contract of indemnity by the affirmative
step of re-enty which must occur at a date subsequent to the filing of
the petition. There can be no debt provable in bankruptcy arising out
of a contract which becomes effective only at the claimant's option and
after the inception of the proceedings the fulfillment of which is contingent on what may happen from month to month or up to the end
of the original term. Such a covenant is not the equivalent of an
agreement that bankruptcy shall be a breach of the lease and the
consequent damages be measured by the difference between the present value of the remainder of the term and the total rent to fall due
in the future." (Italics mine.)
In the Outfitters' Operating Realty Co. case the lease was apparently
drawn with the dictum in the Manhattan Realty case in mind. Because
of its importance the covenant will be quoted in full as follows: "For
the more effectual securing to the Lessor of the rent-and the other payments herein provided, it is agreed as a further condition of this
lease that the filing of any petition in bankruptcy or insolvency by
or against the Lessee shall be deemed to constitute a breach of this
lease, and thereupon, ipso facto, and without entry or other action by
the Lessor, this lease shall become terminated; and, notwithstanding
any other provisions of this lease, the Lessor shall forthwith upon such
termination be entitled to recover damages for such breach in an
amount equal to the amount of the rent reserved in this lease for the
residue of the term hereof, less the fair rental value of the premises
for the residue of said term." The lessee became bankrupt and the
claim of thd lessor under this provision was expunged by the trustee.
The judge affirmed the order. Upon appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the holding, and, in a decision
written by Circuit Judge Learned Hand, held that under this provision the claim was provable.
The reasons for the holding may be analyzed as follows: (1) Claims
for future rent are not provable because they are contingent; 83 and
(2) Under this provision the claim is not contingent in right because
the mere filing of the bankruptcy petition ends the lease; nor is it
contingent in amount because both the fact that there is a loss and
the amount of the loss are at once ascertainable. The provision making bankruptcy ipso facto terminate the lease without any necessity
or choice of re-entry precludes the objection which was raised in the
Manhattan case that the claim was not due and owing at the time
33 But see Judge Learned Hand's deduction from the Maynard case in Manhattan Properties v. Irving Trust Co., 66 Fed. (2d) 470, at 471.
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the petition was filed. 34 The second part of the provision is more
subtle but none the less effective. By establishing definitely the fact
of the loss and providing a workable scheme for liquidation it obviates
the objections raised against the claim in the Manhattan case. To
quote: "It is the uncertainty in fact of the loss (in other cases) that
invalidates the claim; that is not remedied by an approximation which
the law will accept in other connections. But when the parties have
agreed that the lessee shall pay a sum to be ascertained by an accessible standard, the bankruptcy court is not liquidating a future loss
at all; in its place the parties have substituted a promise, which does
not look to the future, which is to pay the difference between two
amounts presently ascertainable." (Italics mine.) The gist of the matter is that under this clause the claim is immediately liquidated or at
least capable of liquidation by the application of a formula agreed to
by the parties which is, in effect, as simple as A over B.
The fact that the value of the rent reserved is to be used in computing the damages does not make the claim one for rent so as to be
affected by the mysterious "diversity between the duties which touch
the realty and the mere personality." The objection that the clause
provided for a penalty was disposed of on the grounds that the court
was free to measure the damages in accordance with the patent general
purpose to give the lessor indemnity and no more.
Thus it has been established that when the fact of the loss is certain the court will not hesitate to measure the damages even though
this envolves a determination of the difference between the amount
of the rent reserved and the fair rental value of the premises. This
holding is consistent with decisions in cases involving suits for the
breach of a lease by a prospective lessee, 35 receiverships, 36 and dissolution proceedings. 37 The holding of the Supreme Court in Maynard v.
Elliott 38 further supports this holding for in that case the holder of
certain notes endorsed by the bankrupt was allowed to prove his claim.
It is submitted that the liquidation of the amount of such a claim is
much more difficult than is the fixing of the amount of loss due to the
breach of a lease.39
35

See note 17, supra.
Addieg v. Tull, 187 Fed. 101 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1911).

34

340 (E. D. Mich., 1932).

36

Leo v. Pearce Stores Co., 57 Fed. (2d)

37

In re Mullings Clothing Co., op. cit. supra note 28.

38

Op. cit. supra note 2.

39 See, also, Filene's Sons v. Weed, op. cit. supra note 28.
In 33 Col. L. Rev. 213, at page 235, the authors, Messers Schwabacher and
Weinstein, have this to say: "Executory contract and lease claims should be
valued not by determining what will become due and discounting the sum so
ascertained to its value at the time of the filing of the petition; but (as performance has become impractical) by determining what would have come due
had the contract of lease been performed, and by crediting that sum against the

NOTES
Because of the unsettled state of the law on this subject it is impossible to formulate any bard and fast rules to be observed but the
following conclusions may well be borne in mind by one about to
draw up a lease for a landlord:
1. Unless the lease contains some special provision to be operative
in the event of the tenant's bankruptcy, a claim for future rent in the
bankruptcy proceedings will not be allowed.
2. The termination of the lease upon the bankruptcy of the lessee
must not be optional with the lessor or dependent upon the exercise
of his right of re-entry. The filing of bankruptcy proceedings must ipso
facto end the lease and give rise to a cause of action for the breach
thereof.
3. Provision must be made for some form of liquidated damages.
4. The lessor's right to damages must not be based upon a claim
for future damages as such for this makes it problematical whether
or not anything will ever be due. This follows from conclusion two,
that is, since the bankruptcy ends the lease the landlord's claim must
be for damages not for rent.
5. The measure of damages reserved may be the difference between
the present value of the remainder of the term and the total rent to
fall due in the future but it must be clear that this is only a measure
of damages and not the claim itself.
6. The damages provided for must not be so excessive as to constitute a penalty. Indemnity should be all that is sought. This includes
discounting future payments to their present value.
Tkos. L. McKevitt.

CONTRACTS-ANTICPATORY

B1R-AcH-RENUNCIATION.--Ordinarily

no breach of contract can occur, and no action can be maintained on
a contract until after the time for performance has passed. Yet this
is not always the case. If one party repudiates his contract the law
does not force the other party to wait until after performance should
have been made before he can obtain relief. In such a situation the innocent party may pursue any one of three courses. In the first place
value of the performance retained by the claimant. Though it is bankruptcy and
not a breach that excuses further performance and gives rise to the right of
vaIuation, the rules of valuation employed in ordinary law cases can be applied
by analogy in bankruptcy, and a claim should be held provable if it can be so
valued.... It is difficult to see why stricter rules of valuation should be applied
in bankruptcy than at law . . .for the effective realization of the policies of the
act urgently demands valuation."
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he may rescind the contract altogether, and bring an action to recover
for any performance he has already made. Secondly, he may elect to
consider the repudiation as a breach of contract, and bring an action
immediately to recover for the damages that he has suffered and. will
suffer because of the breach. Finally, he may await the time when
performance should have been made and then bring an action on the
contract. In view of this doctrine of anticipatory breach of contract as
it has been established in most jurisdictions, it often becomes important, and sometimes very difficult, to determine just what will amount
to a sufficient repudiation to give the other party the right to consider
it as a breach and maintain his action on the contract before the time
for performance has arrived. It should be noted at the outset that the
courts will not apply the doctrine to unilateral or unconditional obligations. It is only where the contract is bilateral and the promises
are dependent that the doctrine has any application. It it also inapplicable where the contract, although originally bilateral, has become unilateral by full performance on one side.
In a recent Federal case, Suburban Improvement Co. v. Scott Lumber Co.' the defendant contracted to purchase certain lots from the
plaintiff. The defendant duly took and paid for all of the lots it was
obliged to take during the year 1928. In the spring of 1929, however,
a dispute arose between the parties as to the proper interpretation of
the contract. The defendant contended, erroneously as was later decided by the court, that it was not bound to purchase any of the lots,
but that the contract merely gave it the option to purchase the lots
if it so desired. On May 4 defendant wrote a letter to the plaintiff
setting forth this contention and stating with regard to making further purchases during 1929, "With reference to the last paragraph in
your letter as previously noted in this letter the matter of taking
additional lots has not been under consideration by our Board of
Directors, and according to the terms of the option, we see no reason
for taking the matter up with the Board of Directors at this time,
as according to the terms of the option, we are allowed the entire
time of the calendar year 1929 in which to exercise our rights to take
additional lots." The plaintiff brought suit for specific performance on
the ground that this amounted to an anticipatory breach of contract.
The court gave judgment for the defendant, deciding that the defendant had not unequivocally refused to perform its contract, and that
there had not been a sufficient repudiation to justify the plaintiff in
electing to consider the contract as breached. The defendant did not
refuse to take the lots that it was obliged to purchase during 1929;
it merely stated that it did not deem it necessary at that time to
determine whether it would purchase the lots or not. It might well be
1 67 Fed. (2d) 335 (1933).
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argued, however, that the defendant did unequivocally repudiate its
contract. It denied all liability on its part to purchase any of the lots
that it was bound to purchase during the year 1929. If it did decide
to purchase more lots later in the year it would not be performing the
contract that actually existed; it would rather be exercising a right
which it thought it had under an option contract that did not exist.
Nevertheless, the possibility that the defendant might decide to purchase more lots later on in the year was sufficient, in the mind of the
court, to prevent this from being an anticipatory breach of contract.
In Dingley v.Oler,2 one of the early cases decided by the United
States Supreme Court on this question, the plaintiff and defendant
made a contract by which the plaintiff delivered several cargoes of
ice to the defendant during the season of 1879, and the defendant
was to redeliver a like quantity of ice to the plaintiff during the season
dosing in September, 1880. Ice was worth 50 cents a ton when the
plaintiff delivered it to the defendant, and it was worth $5 a ton at
the time for redelivery to the plaintiff. In July, 1880, the defendant
wrote a letter to the plaintiff which concluded as follows: "We must
therefore decline to ship the ice for you this season, and claim as
our right to pay you for the ice in cash at the price you offered other
parties here (that is 50 cents) or give you ice when the market reaches
that point." The court held this not to be a sufficient repudiation to
amount to an anticipatory breach of contract. The defendant did not
positively refuse to perform; he merely refused to perform unless the
market value of ice went down to 50 cents a ton. It is true that it
was very unlikely that the market value of ice would go down to
50 cents a ton within the time in which performance of this contract
was to be made. At the time the letter was written ice was worth
$5 a ton. The defendant refused to perform unless it declined to one
tenth of its value within a period of less than three months. However,
unlikely this might be it was sufficient to prevent this from being an
anticipatory breach.3
The question may also ,come up as to whether a statement by one
party that he will be unable to perform, as distinguished from a
statement that he will not perform whether he is able or not, is sufficient to amount to an anticipatory breach. In Jolmston v. Milling 4
such a statement was held not to be an anticipatory breach. In that
case A. had leased certain premises to B. for a period of 21 years
2

117 U. S. 490, 503, 6 S. Ct. 850, 29 L. Ed. 984 (1886).

a Full performance had been made by the plaintiff in this case at the time
the alleged anticipatory breach took place, and the defendant's obligation was
then unconditional. However, the court did not consider this point in refusing to
hold that an anticipatory breach had occurred.
4 16 Q. B. Div. 460 (1886).
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subject to B.'s right to terminate the lease at the end of four years on
giving six months notice. A. covenanted that at the end of the first
four years of the term he would rebuild the premises in the manner
specified, if he received six months notice from B. requiring him to do
so. A. repeatedly told B. he was unable to get the money to rebuild
the premises according to the terms of his covenant. The court held
that these statements did not amount to an anticipatory -breach on
the ground that they were not a declaration that whatever happened,
whether A. came into money or not, he did not intend to rebuild the
premises. 5 Other courts, however, have considered such a statement
sufficient to constitute an anticipatory breach. In Louisville Packing
Co. v. Crain 6 the defendant contracted to purchase a certain quantity
of meat from the plaintiff during the year 1908. In February of that
year the defendant wrote to the plaintiff stating that he was unable
to pay for any more meat at that time and did not know when he
would be able to do so, but that when he was able he would. The
letter also contained a request to ship the remainder of the meat
called for by the contract. The court held this to be a sufficient repudiation to amount to an anticipatory breach. There seems to be no
good reason for making a distinction between inability to perform and
unwillingness to perform in deciding what amounts to an anticipatory
7
breach. Both are followed by practically the same results.
In Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium Association 8 the
United States Supreme Court held that an anticipatory breach of contract occurred where an involuntary petition in bankruptcy was filed
against a firm that had an executory contract outstanding. In that
case the Scott Transfer Company made a contract with the Chicago
Auditorium Association whereby the Association granted to the Transfer Company for a period of five years the baggage and livery privilege of the Auditorium hotel in Chicago. The Transfer Company was
to pay $6,000 in monthly instalments of $100 each for the baggage
privilege, and $15,000 in monthly instalments of $250 each for the
livery privilege. After part performance the transfer Company became
bankrupt and the trustee did not elect to complete the performance
of the contract. The court held this to be an anticipatory breach, saying: "In short, it must be deemed an implied term of every contract
that the promisor will not permit himself, through insolvency or acts
of bankruptcy, to be disabled from making performance; and in this
view bankruptcy proceedings are but the natural and legal consequence
5 The decision was also based on the points that plaintiff had not elected to
consider these statements as an anticipatory breach, and that defendant's obligation
was independent.
6 141 Ky. 379, 132 S. W. 575 (1910).
7 See Williston on Contracts, Vol. 3, § 1326.
8

240 U. S. 581, 36 S. Ct. 412, 60 L. Ed. 811, L. R. A. 1917 B, 580 (1916).
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of something done or omitted to be done by the bankrupt, in violation
of his engagement. .

.

. We conclude that proceedings whether volun-

tary or involuntary, resulting in an adjudication of bankruptcy, are
the equivalent of an anticipatory breach of an executory agreement
within the doctrine.

.

." In considering bankruptcy as an anticipatory

breach it must be so considered as of the time of the filing of the
petition, because only claims existing at that time are provable against
the bankrupt's estate.
In addition to the above ways in which a repudiation amounting
to an anticipatory breach may be made it is quite generally agreed
that the selling of land or goods to which the contract relates before
the time for performance has arrived will amount to an anticipatory
breach of contract.9 Furthermore, any act on the part of one of the
parties which makes it impossible for him to perform his part of the
contract is sufficient to warrant the other party in considering it as
an anticipatory breach and bringing suit.
After considering these cases it may be stated that to constitute a
repudiation sufficient to justify the other party in electing to consider
it as an anticipatory breach, it must be an absolute refusal to perform
the obligations to arise under the contract in the future. Courts are
unwilling to permit a person to maintain an action on a contract before the time for the other party to perform has arrived, unless it is
reasonably certain that that other party is not going to perform.
Where one party merely states "I do not think that I shall perform,"
that may be sufficient to justify the other, party in refraining from
any further performance on his part, but it is not sufficient to justify
him in bringing an action immediately to recover damages for breach
of contract.
John A. Berry.

GUARANTY--CONSIDERATION-FORBEARANCE.-A

guaranty promise

is no exception to the general rule that a promise, to be enforceable at
law, must be supported by a sufficient consideration. Consideration
may be defined as some benefit received by the promisor as a price
for his promise, or some detriment suffered by the promisee in reliance upon the promise. The term gratuitous surety or guarantor is
somewhat misleading in that it might be taken to mean that there is
no consideration to support the promisor's promise in such cases, or
that the promise is binding upon the promisor in the absence of con9 Roehm v. Horst, 178 U. S. 1, 20 S. Ct. 780, 44 L. Ed. 953 (1900); Adams

v. Bridges, 141 Ga. 418, 81 S. E. 203 (1914).
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sideration. This of course is not true. The term has very likely become a part of the nomenclature of the law because of the fact that
a person who makes such a promise of guaranty usually does not receive any direct benefit for his promise. It serves the useful purpose
of distinguishing such a promisor from a paid surety, one who is in
the business of making such promises and receives a money compensation for assuming the risk of the promise.
In the case of a gratuitous guarantor we ordinarily must look to
the detriment side of our definition of consideration to find the basis
of holding the promisor to his promise. In the usual case the guaranty
promise is made at the same time that the promisee loans the money
or extends the credit to the principal debtor. In this case the consideration for the guaranty contract is the same as the consideration
for the principal contract. The promisee suffers the detriment of parting with his money in reliance upon the guarantor's promise.
Where the guarantor makes his promise after the principal contract is made the consideration for the principal contract cannot furnish the consideration for the contract of guaranty. The promisee has
already parted with his money or extended the credit to the principal
debtor, and he did not do this in reliance upon the guarantor's promise.
Consequently, some new consideration is needed to make the promise
binding. If the principal debt is due, a forbearance on the part of the
creditor from bringing suit against the principal debtor will furnish a
sufficient consideration to support a third person's promise to pay
the debt if the principal debtor fails to do so. We come now to a consideration of the principal question of this note: Is it necessary that
the creditor bind himself to forbear from bringing suit against the
principal debtor for a definite length of time in order to furnish a
sufficient consideration to make the guarantor's promise binding? Or,
is it enough if the creditor actually does refrain from bringing suit
for a reasonable length of time?
In a recent New York case I one Johnson owed a debt to the bank,
which was due and for which the bank was pressing Johnson for payment. The bank finally consented not to press Johnson for payment
if Scherer would guarantee the payment of the debt. As a result,
Scherer sent the following writing to the bank: "For value received
and to enable Edmund C. Johnson of Eggertsville, New York . . . to
obtain credit, from time to time of the East Side National Bank, of
Buffalo, N. Y., I hereby request said bank to extend from time to
time to said debtor such credit as said bank may deem proper, and
I hereby guarantee the full and proper payment to said bank at
maturity . . . to the extent of ten thousand and 00/100 dollars . . 2"
1

Scherer v. East Side Nat. Bank of Buffalo, 188 N. E. 645 (N. Y. 1934).
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The bank made no agreement to refrain from bringing suit against
Johnson for any definite time, but in fact did refrain from doing so
for a period of from five to eight months. Scherer brought suit against
the bank to recover $10,000 which was due to him as a depositor of
the bank. The bank pleaded a counterclaim, setting up the fact that
the amount claimed by the plaintiff was applied to the sum owing
the bank on his written guaranty. The court decided in favor of the
defendant bank, holding that there was a sufficient consideration to
support the plaintiff's guaranty promise. In so holding the court said:
"To furnish a valuable consideration, one in the nature of forbearance, it was not necessary that a definite time should be fixed as the
limit or the extent of .the forbearance. . . . The fact that Scherer by
his guaranty requested an extension of credit for Johnson, and that
the bank thereafter, acting upon his written promise, extended the
time and carried the loan for from five to eight months, was sufficient
to make Scherer's promise binding at law."
In contending that there was no consideration to support his promise the plaintiff relied chiefly on a former New York case, Strong v.
Sheffield. 2 In that case the defendant's husband owed a debt to the
plaintiff which was past due. The husband executed a demand note
payable to the plaintiff for the amount of the debt, and the defendant
indorsed this note in consideration of the plaintiff's promise to hold
it until such time as he wanted his money. In an action brought by
the plaintiff on the note the court held that there was no consideration for the defendant's indorsement of the note. The court reasoned
as follows: "It would have been no violation of the plaintiff's promise
if, immediately on receiving the note, he had commenced suit upon it.
Such a suit would have been an assertion that he wanted the money
and would have fulfilled the condition of forbearance. The debtor
and the defendant, when they became parties to the note, may have
had the hope or expectation that forbearance would follow, and there
was forbearance 'in fact. But there was no agreement to forbear for a
fixed time or for a reasonable time, but an agreement to forbear for
such time as the plaintiff should elect. The consideration is to be tested
by the agreement, and not by what was done under it. It was a case
of mutual promises, and so intended. We think the evidence failed to
disclose any consideration for the defendant's indorsement, and that
the trial court erred in refusing so to rule."
While these two cases may at first seem to be conflicting, upon a
closer examination it will be seen that such is not the fact. In the first
case the agreement takes the form of a unilateral contract. The
guarantor made an offer that if the creditor would forbear from
bringing suit against the principal debtor, then he would pay the debt
2

144 N. Y. 392, 39 N. E. 330 (1895).
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if the principal debtor. failed to do so. This offer called for acceptance
by the doing of the thing specified therein-the forbearing from bringing suit against the principal debtor. It is true that no definite time
was specified during which the creditor was to refrain from bringing
suit; but in such a case the law will imply that the creditor must
forbear for a reasonable time in order to accept the offer and form
the contract. The creditor performed the act called for by the offer
by refraining from bringing suit for a period of from five to eight
months. As in all unilateral contracts, the doing of the thing which
the offer called for furnished a sufficient consideration to make the
offeror's promise binding.
In the second case the agreement took the form of a bilateral contract. An offeror has the right to specify in what manner acceptance
is to be made; he may call for acceptance by an act, or acceptance
by a return promise. The guarantor made an offer in this case that if
the creditor would promise to refrain from bringing suit against the
principal debtor, he would pay the debt if the principal debtor failed
to do so. The creditor promised to refrain from bringing suit until such
time as he wanted his money. This was in fact no promise at all. He
could decide that he wanted his money the very next instant, and bring
suit immediately. The creditor was in the same position as if he had not
made the promise. Since no time was specified in the offer for which
the creditor was to promise to forbear, it must be interpreted as requiring the creditor to promise to forbear for a reasonable time. The
creditor failed to make such a promise, and no binding contract was
formed. 3
John A. Berry.

INJUNCTIONs-AcTIONS OR PROCEEDINGS IN OTHER STATE.-In

the recent case of Alspaugh v. New York, C. & S. L. R. Co.1 the general rule was applied, that courts will enjoin its own citizens, over
whom it has jurisdiction from prosecuting an action in another state
where it appears that such suit would be inequitable. This rule is now
followed by most of the courts whether a suit has been commenced or
not. The right of a state to restrain a person over whom it has jurisdiction from bringing a suit is unquestioned. 2 But the earlier view

of the courts was that such action was inconsistent with inter-state
harmony where the suit had already been commenced. 3 In Harris v.
3

See 28 C. J. 922, "Guaranty."

1

188 N. E. 869 (Ind. 1934).
Royal League v. Kavanaugh, 233 Ill. 175 (1908).
Engle v. Scheuberman, 40 Ga. 206 (1869).

2
3
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Pullman 4 the court said, after referring to the English practice of allowing suits already begun to be enjoined: "But it has been held, in
this country, that, after suits are commenced in one of the states, it
is inconsistent with inter-state harmony that their prosecution should
be controlled by courts of another state."
This view has not been followed where it is shown that better
justice will be obtained between the parties. The later view is that it is
not an attempt to control the courts of another state. A state has the
power to compel its own citizens to respect its laws even beyond its
territorial limits. The injunction operates to restrain the person who
is within the jurisdiction of the court and is not an attempt to control
the courts of another state. 5
Because of the nature of this power and the danger of an abuse
of it, courts consider carefully the advisability of issuing an injunction to restrain such proceedings. 6 It must be shown that the court
has jurisdiction and that the suit will be inequitable, as where the
suit will result in fraud, gross wrong or oppression, 7 an evasion of
the laws of the state,8 or where the suit is vexatious or brought to
harass the plaintiff,9 or where the bringing of the suit in another jurisdiction will be a serious inconvenience to the plaintiff or hamper the
administration of justice. 10 In Wabash Ry. Co. v. Peterson 11 it was
84 III. 20 (1876).
5 Wabash Ry. Co. v. Peterson, 187 Ia. 1331.
6 Wabash Ry. Co. v. Peterson, op. cit. supra note 5.
7 Reed v. Holingsworth, 135 N. W. 37 (Ia. 1912) (The defendants, who were
officers of a mining corporation, had fraudulently allowed contracts held by the
corporation for the purchase of mining land to be forfeited without the knowledge of the stockholders, later purchasing the contracts themselves. They then
brought actions in Colorado to have a receiver appointed for the corporation and
to quiet title to the land in question. The plaintiffs as stockholders pray that the
actions in Colorado be enjoined. Held, An injunction will lie to restrain a resident
of a state from prosecuting fraudulent, collusive, or unlawful proceedings in
another jurisdiction.).
8 Culp v. Butler, 122 N. E. 684 (Ind. 1919) (The defendant brought an action against the plaintiff in Illinois for malicious prosecution. The statute of
limitations had run in Indiana, barring defendant's cause of action. Held, A citizen
of a state will be enjoined from prosecuting another citizen of the same state,
in a foreign state for the purpose of evading the laws of his own state.).
9 Gaunt v. Nemours Trading Corp., 194 App. Div. 668 (N. Y. 1921) (The
corporation brought an action at law against Gaunt, who filed a bond for the
payment of any judgment that might be recovered. The corporation then instituted a suit in equity in Massachusetts on the ground that Gaunt had not
enough leviable property to satisfy the debt. Held, The commencement of the
foreign action is vexatious harassing of the opposite party, and will be restrained.).
10 Mason v. Harlow, 114 Pac. 218 (Kan. 1911) (Mason, acting as an attorney for the plaintiff of a suit pending in Kansas against Harlow, went into
Arkansas to take depositions in that suit. While in Arkansas for this purpose,
Harlow brought an action for libel for the purpose of hindering the suit pend4
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held that compelling the defendant to sustain nontaxable expense of
bringing witnesses a long way or make out a defense by deposition is
an irreparable injury which may be enjoined.
An injunction will not be granted where the parties are not within
the jurisdiction of the court, 12 and merely voluntarily appearing in
court for the purpose, of the suit is not sufficient to give jurisdiction.' 3
Neither will the injunction be granted because the laws of the sister
state are not so favorable to the defendant as those of the state where
the injunction is sought. 14 Starting a suit in one jurisdiction and
then dismissing it and bringing a second in another jurisdiction is not
sufficient ground to enjoin the second action. 15
Injunctions against suits in another state do not violate the provisions of the constitution as to comity and full fait and credit, 1' the
theory being that the judgment of the sister state is not attacked for
irregularity or error, but only on the ground of jurisdiction, fraud, or
imposition, and therefore receives the same credit as it is entitled to
in the state where it was pronounced.
By statute courts of the United States are prohibited from granting injunctions to stay proceedings in a court of a state except as
ing in Kansas. Held, Equity will enjoin the prosecution of an action in a foreign
state when it has been brought to harass the opposite party and interfere with
the administration of justice in a suit pending in the jurisdiction where the injunction is sought.).
11 Op. cit. supra note 5.
12 Federal Trust Co. v. Conklin, 99 Atl. 109 (N. J. Eq. 1916) (Conklin, a
resident of New Jersey, was appointed assignee for the benefit of creditors of
Conti. Conti had on deposit a sum with the Trust Co. and the Trust Co. held
notes of Conti. Conklin brought suit in New York for the amount of the deposits. Held, The suit was brought in the official capacity as assignee of a New
York estate. His failure to prosecute the case would lead to his removal and the
injunction would be unenforceable against anyone not a resident of New Jersey.).
13 Carpenter Baggot & Co. v. Hanes, 77 S. E. 1101 (N. C. 1913) (The Company instituted an action in New York, obtained jurisdiction by attachment, and
then instituted this action. The defendant alleges that there was no personal service of the defendant in the New York case and both parties, being properly in
court, the plaintiff bringing the action and the defendant by personal service, the
defendant asks that the New York action be enjoined. Held, The power cannot
be exerted to enjoin the prosecution of a foreign action where the parties are not
domiciled in the jurisdiction of the court merely on the ground that the party
has come into court by bringing an action therein.).
14 Illinois Life Insurance Co. v. Prentiss, 277 Ill. 383 (1917) (The Insurance
Co. issued a policy to a resident of Illinois. The assignee of the policy instituted
a suit in Illinois and a second in Missouri. The Missouri statute allowed a
verdict to be rendered by nine of twelve jurors. Held, It is not sufficient ground
for the granting of an injunction that the laws of the foreign state are not so
favorable to the defendant as those of the forum.).
15 Hammond v. Baker, 3 Sandf. 704 (1851).
16 Cole v. Conningham, 133 U. S. 107 (1890).
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authorized by law relating to bankruptcy proceedings. 17 The basis of
this statute is the avoidance of conflict between courts whose jurisdiction may embrace the same property and persons.1 8 It applies only
to proceedings first commenced in state courts, and is confined to
cases where the jurisdiction of the federal court is originally invoked
to stay proceedings in the state court. The same rule is observed by
the state courts toward the courts of the United States without statutory obligation. In Hemsly v. Myers 19 Caldwell, J., said: "The state
courts observe the rule towards the courts of the United States upon
principle, and without any statute requiring them to do so. It is not
merely a rule of comity, but an absolute rule of law, obligatory on the
courts of both jurisdictions, and absolutely essential to the maintenance of harmonious relations between the state and the United States
courts, and indispensable to the due and orderly administration of
justice in both."
Paul F. O'Neil.

NEGLIGENcE-LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURERS AND VENDORS OF
CHATTELS-In a recent case, Genesee County Patrons Fire Relief

Ass'n. v. L. Sonneborn Sons,1 the principle established in the MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 2 case has been further extended. Charles
J. Call owned a farm. He contracted with the defendant Rib-Stone
Concrete Corporation to build and install a waterproof tank in one of
his barns. After completion an employee was engaged in applying a
waterproofing preparation manufactured by the defendant L. Sonneborn Sons, and known as "Hydrocide No. 889," to the interior of the
tank. Upon taking an ordinary farm lantern into the tank to furnish
light, an explosion and fire occurred resulting in the destruction of
the barn and certain personal property. The fumes of the preparation coming into contact with the flame caused the explosion. The
plaintiff's insurance companies carried fire insurance policies on the
property destroyed. They paid the loss and became subrogated to the
rights of the insured against the defendants. The action was by the insurance company to recover the amount paid to the insured, on the
theory that the loss was occasioned by the negligence of the defendants. At the trial, the complaint against the defendant Rib-Stone was
dismissed; while a verdict against the defendant Sonneborn was re17 Rev. Stats. § 720.
18 Pacific Tel. and Telegraph Co. v. Star Pub. Co., 2 Fed. (2d) 191 (1924).
19 45 Fed. 283 (1891).
1 189 N. E. 551, 263 N. Y. 463 (1934).
2 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050, L. R. A. 1916F, 696 (1916).
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turned, and affirmed by the Appellate Division. In the trial court two
questions were submitted to the jury: First, whether Hydrocide No.
889 is an inherently dangerous commodity. Second, if so, whether the
defendant Sonneborn was negligent in failing to give notice to the
users of the preparation that it was inflammable and should not be
brought into contact with an open flame. The two gallons of "Hydrocide Colorless Waterproofing," which is used for outside work where
a colorless material is required, were shipped in gallon cans, each
having a label which read in part, "Do not use near flame." The shipment also contained a one gallon can of Hydrocide No. 889, with a
label which read "Hydrocide No. 889." This label did not contain any
warning or notice that the contents were inflammable and should not
be used near an open flame. Rib-Stone had never used the preparation and had no knowledge about it. The defendant wrote that it
could be applied in the same manner as paint, either with a brush or
spraying machine. When applied with a brush, by an employee of
Rib-Stone, it exploded and destroyed property. It was conceded that
the commodity was a secret preparation which contained 52 per cent
benzine and 6.7 per cent kerosene and was highly inflammable. The
employee using it at the time of the accident testified that he did not
distinguish the odor of benzine, but to him it smelled like paint. Expert testimony showed that Hydrocide No. 889 was highly volatile
and inflammable. In rendering the decision, Judge Hubbs cites a case
recently decided in England, which extended the rule of liability to
cover property damages. To quote from his opinion: "In Anglo-Celtic
Shipping Co. v. Elliott & Jeffery, 42 T. L. R. 297, the facts were that
a secret preparation manufactured by the defendants was used near
a lighted candle by a third person not the defendant vendee. An explosion occurred which resulted in the burning of plaintiff's ship. A
recovery was permitted for the property damage. The preparation
was sold without warning of its dangerous nature. The case cannot
be distinguished from the present case at bar on the facts." It was
held, in the English case, that privity of contract between manufacturer
and person injured through use of manufactured article is not necessary to justify recovery of damages for manufacturer's negligence.
Professor Harper, in his late work on Torts, says: "Several cases
have established a duty on the part of manufacturers of patent medicines and other compounds made under a secret formula which is
similar to that under discussion. This duty is, in substance, to adopt
reasonable means of giving such information and instructions as will
make it reasonably safe for those intended to use it." 3
The starting point of any discussion of the duty owed by a manufacturer or vendor of a chattel to persons likely to sustain harm
3 Harper, Law on Torts, § 106.
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from the defective manufacture or condition thereof is the Doctrine of
Winterbottom v. Wright,4 which states the principle that there is no
duty to anyone other than to the immediate vendee to employ reasonable care to discover dangerous qualities or defects in the article.5
In Thomas v. Winchester 6 the liability of the manufacturer was
extended. Here the defendant sold to a druggist a poisonous drug
labelled "extract of dandelion." The druggist resold it to the plaintiff who was allowed to recover. The defendant knowing the dangerous character of the drug owed the duty to all who were liable to
sustain harm therefrom to advise them correctly of its dangerous
properties.
The leading case on liability of manufacturer or dealer for personal injuries caused by defects in automobiles is MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Company, wherein it is held that the manufacturer
of an automobile, who purchased the wheels from a reputable maker,
is liable to one who purchases a car from a retailer for an injury
caused by the collapse of a wheel because of defects which would have
been discoverable by reasonable inspection. The view taken by the
court in this case that, if the nature of the thing manufactured is such
that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, and the manufacturer knows that the product will be
used by purchasers without testing its fitness, he owes the purchaser
a duty to exercise care in making it; this is in accordance with the
weight of authority. 7
Prior to this case "It had been held that an affirmative obligation
to use care in manufacturing an article applied, so far as persons other
than the immediate vendee were concerned, only to manufacturers of
articles which were 'inherently dangerous' to or which were designed
to 'affect' life and limb. This limitation never supported by any rational considerations, has been definitely abandoned by the more
liberal courts." 8
In referring to the MacPherson case, Professor Harper says: "The
test is not whether the article is dangerous when carefully con4 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, Bohlen, Cases on Torts (3rd ed.)
466 (1842).
5 Bohlen, Liability of Manufacturers to Persons Other Than Their Immediate
Vendees (1929) 45 L. Quar. Rev. 455.
6 6 N. Y. 397, 52 Am. Dec. 455 (1852).
7 Annotation to Mac Pherson v. Buick Motor Co., L. R. A. 1916F, 704.
8 Harper, Law on Torts, § 106; Heckel v. Fort Motor Co., 101 N. J. L.
385, 128 AtI. 332, 39 A. L. R. 989 (1925); Johnson v. Cadillac Motor Car Co.,
216 Fed. 878, 8 A. L. R. 1033 (1919). Contra: Ford Motor v. Liberty, 160 Pac.
901 (Okla. 1916); Lewis v. Terry, 111 Cal. 39, 43 Pac. 398, 53 Am. St. Rep. 146
(1896); Burkett v. Studebaker Bros. Mfg. Co., 126 Tenn. 467, 150 S. W. 421
(1912); Standard Oil Co. v. Munary, 119 Fed. 572 (1902).
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structed but, whether it is likely to cause serious bodily harm if care-

lessly made." 9 But in Parsierv. Wappler Electric Co.10 the complaint
alleged that the defendant manufactured and sold to one Geiser a
machine which they knew was to be used by him in treating persons
for the removal of superfluous hair, and the defendants knew that the
machine when so used would cause injuries, severe pain and distress.
A motion was made under the rules of Civil Practice to dismiss the
complaint for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action. The Supreme Court of New York denied the motion, the court
saying, after referring to the MacPherson case: "It cannot be that
the defendants would be liable, if the dangerous character of the
machines were due to negligence in their construction, and yet would
not be liable if the machine were to their knowledge dangerous though
constructed with due care and without negligence." 11 So the test, in
such cases, is not only whether the article is dangerous when carefully constructed but also whether it is likely, to the manufacturer's
knowledge, to cause serious bodily harm, even if carefully made.
William I. Klima, Jr.

NEGLIGENCE-OWNERS AND OCCUPIERS OF REAL ESTATE-LIABILI-

TY TOWARDS PERSONS AND PROPERTY OUTSIDE THE PREMISES.-Two
recent decisions call for a discussion of the subject of liability of an
occupier or possessor of real estate to persons outside the premises for
harm caused by conditions thereon. Previous to a discussion of these
cases the writer will consider the principles of liability that are set
forth in the cases and in the Restatement of the Law of Torts. As a
general rule the common law does not impose upon one person the
duty to act for tire protection of others; and a possessor of land is under no duty to make his land safe with respect to persons outside the
premises or upon adjoining highways except as to such conditions
thereon which have resulted from an earlier human activity.' "This
may be due to a survival, often found where the rights and liabilities
of the owners and possessors of land are concerned, of an early general theory that activity is essential to liability, or it may be due to
the concept that those who take possession of land or establish highways must bear the natural disadvantages which the location of the
land or highway involves." 2 To this general rule there are exceptions
which will be considered herein.
9 Notre Dame Lawy. Vol. IX, No. 3, p. 360, n. 11.
10 Notre Dame Lawy. Vol. IX, No. 3, p. 360, n. 12.
11 Op. cit. supra note 9.

1

See Explanatory Notes on Torts, Tentative Draft No. 4, 30.

2

Op. cit. supra note 1.
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Liability of a possessor of land to persons outside the premises for
harm caused by natural conditions thereon. There are a few American
cases which are authority for the principle that the owner or occupier
of real estate is not subject to liability for harm caused to others outside the premises by conditions upon the premises that are due to
natural causes. Thus in Roberts v. Harrisona there was a petition filed
by a number of persons to compel the removal of a pond of water
which had collected upon the premises of H. The accumulation of the
water was due to natural causes and not to any act of H. It was held
that there was no nuisance and so there could be no order of abatement. Clearly, under this decision, there would be no civil liability to
persons outside the premises on the ground that the pond was a
nuisance. In Barring v. Commonwealth 4 the authorities of the city of
C. had elevated the grade of a street above the natural surface of the
defendant's lot, and the owner of an adjoining lot on the side of the
n-atural drainage filled up his lot to the level of the street; neither the
city nor this owner had made any provision for the escape of water
from the defendant's lot, in consequence of which the water accumulated into a noxious pond. It was held that these acts did not render
the defendant liable for continuing a nuisance. He had done no act
towards creation of the pond. The lot was at its natural level; and
the house upon it was built upon that surface. The defendant, in this
case, was the owner, but not the occupier, of the lot upon which the
alleged nuisance existed. Here again is authority for the rule that the
owner or occupier is not subject to civil liability for the natural condition of his premises. There are a few cases "dealing with statutes
which require landowners to take active steps to prevent the natural
condition of the land from injuring their neighbors and which deal
with the constitutionality of such statutes, a question which could not
arise if the common law required the possessors of land to take such
action." 5 Thus in Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. May 6 a Texas statute
imposing a penalty upon railroads for allowing Johnson grass or Russian thistles to mature and go to seed upon their roads was held not
to deny .the railway companies equal protection of the laws under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
3 101 Ga. 773, 28 S. E. 995 (1897) ; op. cit. supra note 1.
4 63 Ky. (2 Duv.) 95 (1865); op. cit. supra note 1.
5 Explanatory Notes on Torts, op. cit. supra note 1, at p. 31, citing: Wurts
v. Hoagland, 114 U. S. 606 (1885); Missouri K. & T. Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U. S.
267 (1904); Nickerson v. Boston, 131 Mass. 306 (1881); St. Louis v. Gulath,
179 Mo. 38, 77 S. W. 744 (1903); Hartwell v. Armstrong, 19 Barb. 166 (1854).
"The text-writers who have mentioned the matter are dear to the effect that
there can be no liability unless the nature of the property is changed by the
act of man; Salmond [Law of Torts] (3d ed.) 205; Clerk & Lindsell, Law of
Torts (7th ed.) 420; Wood, Nuisances, 116." Explanatory Notes on Torts, supra.
6 Op. cit. supra note 5.
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Liability of a possessor of land to persons outside the premises for
harm caused by forces of nature operating upon his land made receptive thereto by normal acts of husbandry. Where the condition which
causes the harm is a natural one the possessor is not liable although
it was the husbandry of the possessor which induced the natural condition. 7 Thus in Giles v. Walker 8 the court held that there was no
duty on a possessor to cut thistles, which sprang up when the ground
was plowed, and so prevent their spread to adjoining land. And in
Middlesex Co. v. McCue 9 the owner of land was held to have the
right to cultivate it in a reasonable and usual manner even though as
a result some of the loosened earth was washed into plaintiff's mill
pond, filling it up, to plaintiff's damage. The courts apparently feel
that natural husbandry is a thing to be encouraged and that neither
party being at fault, the one being harmed must bear the expense.
Liability of a possessor of land to persons outside the premises for
harm due to the creation or maintenance of dangerous artificial conditions. Having considered the liability of a possessor of land to those
outside the land for ordinary natural conditions on the land and for
natural conditions aroused by the possessor's activity, the next step
would seem to be a consideration of his liability for dangerous artificial
conditions created or maintained on the land. Four divisions of this
problem are suggested by the Restatement of the Law of Torts.10
These are considered in order, with the second and third divisions
grouped together for convenience.
First, the possessor is liable who creates such a condition upon his
land if he knows of its danger or is negligent in not knowing of its
danger. In Crowhurst v. American Burial Board 11 the owner planted
a yew tree on his land and as it grew the branches extended over
the adjoining land. A horse on the adjoining land ate the leaves and
was poisoned thereby. The court held that the defendant-possessor
was liable in damages for the loss although he did not know that the
tree was poisonous. It would seem, also, that one who plants some
noxious growth on his own land, which spreads, would be liable for
the resulting damage. 12 In Crow v. Colson 13 a hotel owner placed
screens over windows which were also equipped with ropes and other
appliances for escape in case of fire. The screens were not fastened so
that they could be swung aside but had to be knocked out in order
Explanatory Notes on Torts,
24 Q. B. D. 656 (1890).
9 149 Mass. 103, 21 N. E. 230
10 Restatement of the Law of
11 4 Ex. Div. 5 (1878).
12 See dictum in Gulf C. & S.
999 (1900).
13 256 Pac. 971 (Kan. 1927).
7
8

op. cit. supra note 1, at p. 31.
(1889).
Torts, Tentative Draft No. 4, § 213.
F. Ry. Co. v. Oakes, 94 Tex. 155, 58 S. W.
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to escape in that manner. A fire occurred and a guest in escaping
necessarily knocked the screen out and it fell to the street, killing the
plaintiff's husband, a policeman. The court held that the hotel owner
was liable for the injury caused by the maintenance of the dangerous
screening. Back of the decisions seems to be the idea that the owner
is getting the benefit of his own undertakings and must take such
benefit with the restriction that he not harm others whom he knows
he will harm or whom he should, as a reasonable man, know he will
be likely to harm.
Secondly, the possessor is also liable for a dangerous artificial condition on his land placed by another with his consent, or without his
consent if he knows of its existence or is negligent in not knowing of
.t.In O'Connor v. Curtis 14 the owner of a building was held liable for
personal injuries suffered by one in the street when the cornice of the
building fell. The cause of the cornice giving way was the pulling of
an electric wire attached to it by another. It was held that the owner
was liable if he knew, or could have known, by the exercise of ordinary diligence, of the danger. The basis of the liability in these cases
is the right of control over premises. The possessor is the most likely
person to discover the danger; he has the power to remove it and no
one else has the right. But above all, he has the power to prevent the
danger by barring others from the premises who would cause the
dangerous condition. Therein lies the difference between dangerous
conditions caused by third persons and those caused by nature. The
possessor has absolute control over his own premises and the law demands that he exercise this control by preventing third persons from
doing that which he could not do himself. But the only preventative
measures he could take against natural forces would be a restriction of
his own natural and ordinary use of his land, and this the law does not
demand.
Lastly, one who takes possession of land on which a dangerous artificial condition has been created is held liable for resulting damages
if he learns of the condition or failed to use ordinary care to learn of it.
In Klepper v. Seymour House 15 the defendants bought a hotel which
they leased to another, reserving to themselves general control over
the building. The roof was at such an angle that it often discharged
large amounts of snow and ice into the street. The plaintiff was injured by snow falling. The court held the defendants liable on the
grounds that they had owned the hotel a sufficient length of time to
be charged with notice of the danger since the snow and ice fell in this
manner frequently each winter. Here again the liability is justly fixed
upon the possessor because of the benefit he derives from the earlier
14

15

S. W. 953 (Tex. 1892).
158 N. E. 29 (N. Y. 1927).
1
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activity and the control he exercises over the premises. The liability
having arisen out of possession, must pass with possession. 16
Liability of a possessor of land to persons outside the premises for
dangerous disrepair of a structure or other artificial condition thereon.
What duty has a possessor of land towards those outside the land, to
keep a safe artificial condition from becoming dangerous through disrepair? The answer, it seems, is that the possessor must use reasonable care to discover the "disrepair" and after discovery must use
ordinary care to make it reasonably safe.17 In Atkins v. Busch 18
strands of a barbed wire fence became detached from the post and fell
into the highway. A passer-by was injured by the loose wire. The court
held that the possessor of the land owed the public a duty to inspect and repair the fence, and failure to know of the danger did not
excuse him from the duty to keep the fence in good repair. In Bannigan v. Woodbury 19 the administrator of an estate, being legally in
control and possession of a building, was held liable when, due to disrepair, a glass window fell out injuring a passer-by on the street below. The burden imposed on the possessor in such cases is a fair one.
The danger of a dilapidated structure to passers-by is obvious. The
possessor cannot benefit by the use of his structure and allow it to
become a danger to the public while he has control over it. The right
of an individual to profit from his holdings must ever be with the
restriction that they do not involve an unreasonable risk to others.
Liability of a possessor of land to those outside the land for activities carried on upon the premises. "A possessor of land is subject to
liability for bodily harm to others outside the land caused by an activity carried on by him thereon which he realizes or should realize as
involving an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them under the same
conditions as though the activity were carried on at a neutral place." 20
(By "neutral place" is meant one in which both parties have an equal
right to be, such as a public dance-hall or highway.) He is negligent
then if he conducts activities which he should realize as a reasonable
man involve an unreasonable risk to those outside the premises. As the
Restatement of the Law of Torts 21 points out, "The public interest
in a possessor's free use of his land may be a factor in determining
whether the risk involved in his act is reasonable or unreasonable."
In Wolf v. Des Moines Elevator Co., 22 a leading case on the subject,
these principles are clearly brought out. The defendant operated a
16 Explanatory Notes on Torts, op. cit. supra note 1, at pp. 38, 39, 40.
17 Restatement of the Law of Torts § 235.
18 141 La. 180, 74 So. 897, L. R. A. 1917 E, 809 (1917).
19 166 Mich. 491, 122 N. W. 531 (1909).
20 Restatement of the Law of Torts § 241.
21 Op. cit. supra note 20.
22

126 Iowa 659, 98 N. W. 301, 102 N. W. 517 (1905).
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gasoline engine in connection with its elevator. The premises were
close to a railway and a generally traveled road. The plaintiff was
driving a team of horses on the road, when loud exhaust noises coming from the engine frightened the horses which ran away and caused
the injury complained of. The plaintiff pointed out that the defendant
could have muffled this noise effectively by various means and that it
was negligence not to have so done. The court held that it was properly a question of negligence for the jury. As the court observed, ordinary noises and inconveniences caused by industrial plants must be
endured by the traveling public, since present day demands "are such
that the establishment and operation of such plants rot only subserve
the convenience of our people, but, in the larger part, they are matters of necessity." But the traveling public has definite rights, and
if these rights are unreasonably interfered with by the activity of the
possessor of land he is liable for the resulting damage. And, as the
court said, the question for the jury in these cases is this: "Was the
use being made of the adjacent property such in character as to be
unnecessary interference with, or unnecessarily dangerous to, persons
making lawful use of the street or highway?" In Cox v. U. S. Coal
& Coke Co.23 the plaintiff was walking along a railroad track adjacent to the defendant's property. Employees were at work on defendant's premises picking slate or "bone" out of coal as it was being
loaded into a railroad car. One employee threw a large piece of "bone"
striking the plaintiff on the head causing the injury complained of.
The court held that the defendant's employee, having knowledge that
people frequently walked on the railroad track, must use reasonable
care not to injure them; and that to throw large pieces of slate in
the general direction of the tracks without using care to avoid injuring such pedestrians is negligence.
The preceding general discussions on the liability of a possessor of
land towards those outside the land are given as a basis for an un2"
derstanding of the problem suggested by two recent Federal decisions.
The problem is the liability of the possessor of land to persons outside
the premises for harm caused by trees standing thereon. In Chambers
v. Wkelan 25 the plaintiff was injured as the result of the falling of
a dead tree which had been standing close to the road on the defendant's premises. The court held that the defendant-owner of rural lands
is under no duty to inspect trees growing naturally on rural lands, to
determine whether through natural processes of decay they have become dangerous to those on the highway. But in Brandywrine Hundred
23
24

80 W. Va. 295, 92 S. E. 559 (1918).
Chambers v. Whelan, 44 Fed. (2d)

340 (1930); Brandywine Hundred

Realty Co. v. Cotillo, 55 Fed. (2d) 231 (1931).
25

Op. cit. supra note 24.
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Realty Co. v. Cotillo 26 where a dead chestnut tree on defendant's
suburban premises fell upon a passing traveler, in an ordinary wind,
the defendant-owner was held liable for his failure to make the tree
safe, if he knew or could have known by the exercise of ordinary care
of the danger. Neither of these two cases was decided by strict conformity to the general rules previously discussed, and the latter case,
it seems, is directly opposite to them. For, under the general rules,
the first inquiry would be whether or not the tree was planted by the
defendant, or was artificially maintained in its old age by the defendant, or was the product of natural growth. When the tree is of natural
growth, under the rule of Giles v. Walker,27 the possessor of the premises would not be subject to liability even if the danger is known to
him. If the tree were planted, or artificially maintained in its old age
in a dangerous manner, there would be liability for the resulting damage if the possessor of the premises knew of the condition, or was
negligent in not knowing of it. 2 8 If planted in a safe condition, the
possessor would be held liable for damage resulting from its decay if
he failed to make it safe when he knew or should have known of the
(langer.- 9 Both of these Federal cases were concerned with danger
caused by the decay of trees. In Chambers v. Whelan 30 the doctrine
of Giles v. Walker was actually followed without considering whether
or not the tree was planted or was the product of natural growth. But
since the tree was in the country and the court spoke of it as growing
naturally it seems that the doctrine of Giles v. Walker was properly
applied. In Brandywine Hundred Realty Co. v. Cotillo,3 1 however, the
tree was part of a surburan forest which would indicate that it was
a natural growth. Yet the court held the owner to a duty of inspection
and repair.
In the light of the general rules, the two Federal cases are in direct
conflict with each other. This would suggest that perhaps the general
rules are not found applicable to tree cases. And in Brandywine Hundred Realty Co. v. Cotillo the court says: "We gain little, if any, help
from the many cases where liability of abutting property owners to
those using a street or highway are considered, for each case depends
on its own particular facts, which are not the facts in the present
case. After all is said and done, this case turns on the application of
the time honored principle of law, 'sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas'
-so use your own as not to injure another." The court in this case reasons that even though the condition is a natural one it is within the
26
27
28
29
30
31

Op. cit. supra note 24.
Op. cit. supra note S.

Op. cit. supra note 10
Op. cit. supra note

17.

Op. cit. supra note 24.
Op. cit. supra note 24.
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power of the possessor of land to remove it, and if he does not it
leaves the adjacent land-owner or travelers on the adjacent highways
helplessly subject to a great danger. This argument is ably answered
in the Restatement of te Law of Torts.3 2 It points out that as to
adjoining land-owners the law has always been that they take the
land as they find it in its natural state. As to highways, the responsibility for trees close to the road falls on those charged with keeping
the road safe. The possessor of land could not object to such officials
entering his land for that purpose. It would be similar to the privilege
of an adjoining land-owner to enter and cut over-hanging branches.
The merits of this position in relation to land in the country is apparent. The burden on the owner would be great while the road officials could readily handle the situation. But, continues the Restatement of the Law of Torts, the objection is raised that in the city the
danger is greater, and the burden to the holder of small city tracts to
inspect trees would be comparatively slight. Here, again, answers the
Restatement of the Law of Torts, the general principles are adequate.
First, it is probable that trees on city property are either artificially
maintained or planted. In either case the possessor must answer for
any damage caused by them. Secondly, most cities provide for proper
officials to inspect such trees.
The cases are not at all uniform, but the majority seem to follow
Chambers v. Whelan and the Restatement of the Law of Torts. That
is, the general principles of the liability of the possessor to those outside the land are applied to tree cases as well. Thus, in Reed v.
Smith 83 it was held that an owner of land who knows that a tree is
decayed, and dangerous to a neighbor's house (and there should be
no difference in the duty owed towards those in a highway from the
duty towards those on neighboring land) is not obliged to remove the
danger and is not liable for damages caused by a subsequent fall of
the tree. The court agreed that since the tree was a natural condition,
the rule of Giles v. Walker applied. MacDonald, C. J. A., said: "I
think there is no warrant for saying that, at common law, one who
allows his land to remain in its natural state (neither he nor his predecessors in title having changed that state), is under any obligation
to his neighbor in respect to what is standing or growing thereon."
This ruling which relieves the owner of a "natural" tree from not only
the duty of inspection but also the duty of removing the dangerous tree
when h knows of the danger, though proper under the rule of Giles
v. Walker, seems a little harsh when applied to trees which endanger
persons as well as property. No other cases have been" found which
deal with the problem of danger from a "natural" tree which the own32
33
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er actually knows about but the Restatement of the Law of Torts suggests that failure to act then might be negligence under certain cir34
cumstances.
In Madeiros v. Honomu Sugar Co.3 5 the court said: "The duty
which the owner of a building or other structure abutting on a street
or other public highway owes to the public and the duty of the owner
of land on which he permits a tree to remain near the public highway are the same in principle." This decision ignores Giles v. Walker
in that it looks upon all trees as structures whether natural or artificial.
Where the tree was placed by man so that from the outset it was
a dangerous condition, the general rules 3 6 concerning created dangerous conditions have been applied. In Smith v. Bonner3 7 a tree was
planted over a cess-pool and was left unsupported by the caving-in
of the cess-pool. A strong wind blew the tree over upon a passing
traveler. The owner of the land was held answerable in damages since
the planting of the tree in such a dangerous condition was the proximate cause of the injury.
The application of the rules 8 concerning the repair of structures
to tree cases is illustrated in Weller v. McCormick.3 9 In that case
the tree was planted on the sidewalk (the fee being in the defendant,
subject to the public easement) by a former owner. The court held
that the defendant, when he purchased the land, obtained the power
of control over the tree and must be held responsible for injuries resulting from failure to keep it in a safe condition. Also, in Brown v.
Milwaukee Terminal Ry. Co. 4 0 the same tests for liability are applied
although the court called the dahgerous condition a nuisance. The following are the words of Stevens, J.: "The planting of shade trees in
public streets, outside the limits of travel either upon the paved portion of the street or upon the sidewalk, does not ordinarily result in
injury or damage to any who use the streets. Such trees, properly
placed do not constitute nuisances. But when such a tree through decay or because of any change in the structure of the tree or in its
surroundings becomes a menace to the safety of those who travel the
street such tree may become a nuisance which will render the owner
of the adjoining lot liable for injuries which may be caused to those
who lawfully use the streets. In such cases where danger results, not
from the planting of the tree, but through subsequent changes for
which the defendant is not responsible, .itis essential to liability that
§ 233, Caveat and Comment to Caveat.
35 21 Hawaii 155, (1912).
34
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it be shown either that the defendant knew of the danger incident to
the maintenance of the tree or that such condition had existed for
such a length of time that, by the exercise of ordinary care, the defendant ought to have discovered the danger and to have removed it
before injuries were sustained by the plaintiff."
When the possessor of land cuts down or permits the cutting down
of a tree on his land he must use the same care that it not injure those
outside the land that he must use in conducting any other activity on
his land. 4 ' In Ver-Vac Bottling Co. v. Hinson 42 it was held that "one
who directs a tree to be felled so near a public highway that possible
danger to the traveling public may reasonably be anticipated as a
natural consequence thereof is bound to use at least ordinary care
possible, under the circumstances to prevent any such injury."
Robert Devine.

RAILROADs-AccIDENTS AT CROSSINGS-DUTY TO STOP, LGOI, AND
LISTEN.-The recent case of Pokora v. Wabash Railroad Co.' has held

that the duty of a traveler to stop, as well as to look and listen, at a
railroad crossing is conditional on the presence of impediments rendering sight and hearing inadequate for his protection, and that a
failure to stop does not make the traveler or motorist contributorily
negligent as a matter of law. The decision of this case is in direct
variance with the previously accepted view of the United States
Supreme Court.

2

An analysis of the judicial opinions and texts on this subject opens
the door to many ramifications of what is commonly spoken of as
the "stop, look, and listen" rule. The invariable rule is that one approaching a railroad crossing must exercise such care as an ordinary
prudent person would under the circumstances. But the effect of a
failure to stop, look, and listen is viewed differently in many states.:
Some courts have held that such a failure is not negligence per se, but
is only evidence of negligence to be considered by the jury, while
other courts have held -that such failure is, or may be, negligence as
a matter of law. Of this latter group the majority of the states hold
that a failure to stop, look, and listen is not necessarily, in all cases,
negligence per se. While the minority of these jurisdictions look upon
such failure as negligence as a matter of law under any and all cir41
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Op. cit. supra note 20.

147 Md. 267, 128 Atl. 48 (1925).

1 54 S. Ct. 580 (1934).
2 The Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Goodman, 275 U. S. 66 (1927).
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cumstances. 3 There is no jurisdiction in which the courts have, in
every instance, held that a failure to stop, look, and listen, before crossing a railroad track was negligence per se, irrespective of the surrounding circumstances. In Pennsylvania, however, the rule is so strictly
4
applied that it is almost without exception.
Such a failure is always negligence per se under certain circumstances, as, for example, in the Federal courts where all the later
cases on the question hold that it is negligence per se not to stop,
look, and listen where the view is obstructed. 5
Some states have adopted statutes which make it unlawful to cross
a railroad without stopping. In the interpretation of these statutes
the courts have, in some instances, regarded the statute as mandatory
and have held that a violation thereof prevents recovery. 6 Other courts
have held that a violation of such a statute does not constitute negligence as a matter of law.7
The Supreme Court of Mississippi, in the case of Yazoo & M. V.
R. Co. v. Williams,s held that one who undertakes to cross a railroad
track without first looking or listening or taking any other precaution
whatsoever is, as a matter of law, guilty of gross negligence. This
court, one year later, in the case of Gulf & S. I. R. Co. v. Adkinson,9
held that a person traveling upon a road crossing the defendant's
track was grossly negligent in proceeding to cross the tracks without
stopping, looking, and listening.
In Pennsylvania the rule that one must stop before crossing a railroad crossing finds its strictest application. In this jurisdiction the
courts impose an unyielding duty to stop, as well as to look and listen,
no matter how clear the crossing or the tracks on either side may be. 10
Alabama, in the case of Birmingham Belt R. Co. v. Nelson," makes
the motorist guilty of contributory negligence for not stopping, looking, and listening.
In Illinois it is a question of fact for the jury as to whether a person is guilty of contributory negligence in crossing a railroad track
without stopping and looking out for an approaching train: 12 This
3 Note, 1 A. L. R. 203.
4

5
6

Note, 1 A. L. R. 203, 218.
Note, 1 A. L. R. 203, 204.
Louisville R. Co. v. Anderson, 15 S. W. (2d)

Fortune v.
74 So. 835
9 77 So. 954
10 Benner v.
7
8

753 (Tenn. 1929).

New York R. Co., 170 N. E. 923 (Mass. 1930).
(Miss. 1917).

(Miss. 1918).
Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co., 105 AtI. 283 (Pa. 1918); Thompson

v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 64 AtI. 323 (Pa. 1906); Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Yingling,
129 AtI. 36 (Md. 1925).
11 11 So. 422 (Ala. 1927).
12
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view is also followed in Indiana, 13 Maryland, 14 Missouri,' 5 and New
York.' 0 The majority of the courts apply the rule prevailing in Montana 1T that failure to stop, look, and listen is not negligence as a
matter of law. But the holding of the United States Supreme Court, in
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Goddman,18 has made violent inroads into judicial opinion. This old view seems to look to the fact
that the accident would have been avoided if the traveler had descended from his vehicle and looked rather than to the action a reasonably
prudent man would have taken under the same circumstances. The
strict view seems to overlook the fact that the process of getting out
of an automobile and looking for an approaching train might prove
just as disastrous to the motorist as if he had not done so. The driver
of the car might be hit by another passing vehicle, he might be hit
by the train even after a diligent effort to ascertain its relative position, if any, due to the fact that a period of time has elapsed since
he first approached the track. The hazards of modern motoring are too
complicated to set any hard and fast rule of conduct, and it seems
to us that to make it negligence as a matter of law for one not to
stop and get out and look for an approaching train is a rule that
has no foundation in practical application. Our main case sees this
difficulty, and the learned Justice Cardozo has seen fit to put the
horse once more before the cart. It is hoped that this decision will
have due effect upon the decisions of the several states.
Donald F. Wise.

TRUSTS-CONSTRUCTIVE

TRuSTS IN

WILL.-In the recent case of

Thomas v. Briggs 1 the Indiana Appellate Court has taken a long
step beyond the precedent set by other courts in imposing constructive
trusts in wills. The will here had been refused probate and although
the reason for its refusal was not given it is to be presumed that there
was defective execution of the instrument.
According to the evidence the testatrix was a married woman of
some seventy-five years. She had been visited by the plaintiff a short
time after her wedding, in 1929, and at the time, in the presence of
the defendant, her husband, had expressed her intention of making
13 Pitt. C. C. and St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Terrell, 95 N. E. 1109 (Ind. 1911).
14 Brehm v. Philadelphia, B. & W. R. Co., 79 Atl. 592 (Md. 1911).
15 Hook v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 63 S. W. 362 (Mo. 1901).
16 Dolan v. Delaware and H. Canal Co. 71 N. Y. 285 (1877).
17 Walters v. Chicago, M. & P. S. R. Co., 133 Pac. 357 (Mont. 1913). See
note 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 135, 145, and cases cited.
Is Op. cit. supra note 2.
1
189 N. E. 389 (Ind. 1934).
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the plaintiff a devisee in her will. On April 12, 1930, while of sound
mind and body, she wrote out the will in question, so informing her
husband. The next day she was taken ill and during that day and the
next few following days she repeatedly asked the defendant to procure
witnesses, in order that she might execute the will. To each of these
requests the defendant promised compliance without acting to comply.
On April 19, 1930, the testatrix sank into a stupor, and on that day
the defendant brought in witnesses, and the will was executed. The
following day the testatrix died. Shortly thereafter the defendant cut
the names of the witnesses off the will. He then asked the witnesses
to keep silence respecting the will, promising them that "they would
not lose anything" thereby. The will was not propounded for probate,
and on April 24, 1930, the defendant was appointed administrator of
the deceased's estate. In May, 1930, the plaintiff obtained a court
order commanding the defendant to bring the will into court and submit it for probate. But probate was refused the will, upon the defendant's objections. And now the plaintiff comes into equity, seeking to
have a constructive trust imposed on the defendant in favor of the
beneficiaries under the will, on the grounds of fraud.
As I have said, the reasons for which the will was refused probate
were presumably faulty execution of the instrument. The cutting off
of witnesses' names could have had no effect under the Indiana Statute, 2 which provides that revocation of a will shall not be valid "unless the testator, or some other person in his presence and by his
direction, with intent to revoke, shall destroy or mutilate the same.. ."
But the statute also provides that the will to be valid must be "attested and subscribed in his [the testator's] presence." 3 And the act
could not be said to be in the presence of the testatrix when she was
in a stupor; and in all probability it was on this ground that the will
was considered defective.
Since, however, the defendant's cutting off of the witnesses' names
had no effect, in what way was he guilty of fraud so as to warrant the
imposition of a constructive trust upon the estate? It is the accusation of the plaintiff that the defendant's promising to aid in the execution of the will and subsequent delay in doing so constituted fraud.
The question, then, narrows down to this: Does the giving of a promise, without consideration, to aid in the execution of a will raise such
a duty upon the promisor that mere delay in complying will constitute
fraud?
First let us see whether the defendant is liable in tort. In Tkorne v.
Deas 4 it was held that a promisor without consideration is not liable
2

Ind. Ann. Stat. (Bums, 1926) § 3455.

3

Ind. Ann. Stat. (Bums, 1926) §
4 Johns. 84 (1809).

4

3452.

NOTES
for nonfeasance; and that only once he undertakes performance is he
liable for misfeasance. So that here the defendant would not be liable
for mere delay in performance. And once he began performance he was
without fault, for he brought the proper witnesses. There may be a
distinction between Tkorne v. Deas and the present case, because of
the interest of the defendant in the suppression of the will. However.
upon close observation I believe that it will be found that this is a
distinction without a difference.
But now let us see what has been the history of constructive
trusts in wills. In the beginning constructive trusts were imposed, says
Professor Ames, for the following reasons: "The spectacle of one retaining for himself a legal title which he had received on the faith
that he would hold it for the benefit of another, was so shocking to
the sense of natural justice that the chancellor at length compelled
the faithless legal owner to perform his agreement." 5
This constituted one class of cases represented by Tkynn v. Tkynn,6
and later on, in the states, by Dowd v. Tucker.7 In the American case
a nephew promised an aunt on her deathbed that he would deed part
of her property, willed entirely to him, to a neice, and by this promise
dissuaded the aunt from executing a codicil she had written which
would have effected this change in her will. The court said: ".

.

. the

case is clearly one of fraud. It is the case of one obtaiffing a conveyance of property by a promise, which he has no intention at the time
to fulfill. It follows therefore that the respondent . . . is bound in

equity and good conscience to make the conveyance."
In line with this view is the case of Ransdell v. Moore.8 Here the
court gave a comprehensive list of cases, both English and American,
to uphold their view. But there seems to be no analogy of situation
between the present case and any of those cited. For in the other cases
the fraud upon which the imposition of the trust was based arose out
of the assent, either actual or implied, of the trustee to comply with
the testator's wishes. And in this case no action was taken in the
husband's favor upon the strength of any promise made by him. And
the fact that he would acquire an interest by not acting after promising to do so would not be material since no property right comes upon the strength of his promise, but rather it is acquired upon the
failure of the testatrix to devise the property to someone else. It
seems pertinent to ask whether there is any material difference if the
property comes to him through a gratuitous promise which he has not
5 Ames, Lectures on Legal History, 247.
6 1 Vern. 296 (1684).
7 41 Conn. 197 (1874).
8 153 Ind. 393 (1899).
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performed or comes because of the failure of the testatrix to devise
the property elsewhere due to his failure to perform that promise.
The courts have also held that if by virtue of a confidential relationship a party is given an interest with the understanding that it
will be distributed according to the testator's wishes he thereby becomes a trustee for the benefit of those who would have been devisees
under a will, if a will had been made. 9 Again, however, there is no
analogy to the present case. Here the fraud arises from the inaction
of the one made trustee.
Perhaps the closest analogy lies in those cases where the deceased
was by force kept from making a will. In Dixon v. Olmius 10 an heir
kept an ancestor locked in a room to prevent execution of any testamentary document. The court held that this constituted fraud, and
imposed a constructive trust upon the property. But at best it would
need a troublesome stretch of the imagination to identify this sort of
positive action with the inaction of the defendant in the instant case.
The learned judge in the principal case seems to be conscious of
the incongruity of his decision. He quotes the Indiana rule in point:
"When an heir or a devisee in a will prevents the testator from providing for one for whom he would have provided for but for the interference of the heir or devisee, such heir or trustee will be deemed
a trustee, by operation of law, of the property..." 11 Then to support
his decision the learned judge interprets the defendant's failure to act
as interference. In fine, "to interfere" means "to fall to act." This
should be received with some excitement among grammatical, as well
as legal, circles.
In conclusion, the decision seems to have only a moral basis. As
we have seen, there is no liability in tort at common law; and never
before has a constructive trust been imposed on one failing to act
where he is under no duty to do so.
Joseph A. McCabe.

WILLS-VALIDITY OF CONDITONS.-When testator devises an estate

for life, "or so long as devisee remains unmarried," is the alternative
a condition subsequent? When he devises a limited estate to continue
as long as the devisee remains unmarried, is this a limitation? Limitations are always valid; conditions subsequent are valid only if they
are reasonable. If the condition is unreasonable, the devisee takes the
original estate not subject to it.
9 Barron v. Stuart, 136 Ark. 431 (1918).
10 1 Cox Eq. 414 (1787).

11

Op. cit. supra note 8; Vance v. Grow, 185 X. E. 335 (Ind. 1933).

NOTES
This rather arbitrary and much criticized distinction between a condition subsequent and a limitation gathers greater importance in Indiana because of an unusual statute: "A devise or bequest to a wife with
a condition in restriint of marriage shall stand, but the condition shall
be void." I Practically all other courts hold that a condition subsequent
in general restraint of marriage of the testator's widow is a good condition.
In 'Newton v. Wyatt,2 a recent Indiana case, the following bequest

was considered: "'Item 1 of my estate I give devise and bequeath all
my estate real personal and mixed and the income of it to my wife,
Jane Wyatt, after the debts, taxes and repairs have been paid and two
hundred fifty dollars and not over three hundred dollars has been paid
for a monument to be'erected to mark my resting place, for and during her natural life, or so long as she remains my widow.' " The court
held that the condition, or so long as sie remains my widow, was void
as against public policy and that the wife took a life estate not subject
to the condition. In disposing of the case, the court said:

"...

having

first given her the life-estate, the testator could not cut it down by a
condition in restraint of marriage. The condition may not be expressed
in terms in the will, but is contained in it.as fully as if the language
had been 'during her natural life, provided she shall not again marry.' "
The appellant (defendant below) insisted that Thompson v. Patten 3
controlled this case. In that decision the bequest was as follows: " 'I
will, devise and bequeath all of my property real and personal to my
wife Hannah Thompson to be and remain her absolute property as
long as she remains my widow.'" In construing this provision, the
court said:

"...

a husband may devise to his wife an estate to con-

tinue during her widowhood, and . . . he is not obliged to devise to
her a larger estate. We have no hesitancy in saying that the provisions
of the will now under consideration are not conditions in restraint of
marriage, but amount only to a limitation of the estate devised . .
The two bequests are readily distinguishable. In the Newton v.
TWyatt, Smith, J., has this to say: "In the Thompson Case, the
testator does not give to his wife a definite estate, and then attempt
to impose a condition upon it by limiting the devise to her so long as
she remains his widow, but gives her a limited estate during widowhood. In the instant case, testator devises a life estate to his wife;
then imposes a condition which is in direct violation of the statute
[Ind. Ann. Stat. (Burns, 1926) § 3502] . . 2'
The important question is: Has the testator given a specific and
definite estate before imposing the restriction? This seems to be the
1
2

Ind. Ann. Stat. (Burns, 1926) § 3S02.
188 N. E. 697 (Ind. App. 1934).

70 Ind. App. 490, 123 N. E. 705 (1917).
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most important consideration in determining whether it is a condition
subsequent or a limitation. If he has given a specific estate it is a
condition subsequent; if not, it is a limitation.. This distinction is
more forcefully brought out by several other Indiana cases.
In Coon v. Bean I the devise was as follows: " 'To my beloved wife,
I give and devise, in lieu of her interest in my lands, the farm on which
we now reside, situate in the county of Fayette and State of Indiana,
containing about one hundred acres, during her natural life, or so long
as she may remain my widow."' The court disposed of the case in
the following words: "We have no doubt that she took a life-estate.
Her subsequent marriage, therefore, did not terminate the estate vested
in her. It is very clear that the testator intended that she should have
a life-estate, unless she should marry again. By the will a life-estate
is first given, and then this is attempted to be conditionally cut down,
in the same sentence, by the alternative words, 'or so long as she may
remain my widow.' If he had given her the estate simply as long as
she might remain his widow, the case would have been like that of
Harmon v. Brown. . .

."

In Harmon v. Brown 5 the bequest was: "'I

give and bequeath unto my beloved wife, Penina, during her widowhood, all my real and personal estate, to be held and freely possessed
and enjoyed during her widowhood. .

.

. I also order that when my

beloved wife, Penina, ceases to be my widow, and my youngest children come of age, all my real estate be divided equally among all my
heirs.' " The court held that this was a limitation, not a condition, saying: "The words employed by the testator, however, in defining the
quantity of estate to be taken by the widow, are words of limitation
and not of condition. The estate was limited to her during her widowhood. No greater estate was devised to her. The estate thus devised to
her was not attempted by the will to be cut down by any condition
whatever."
When called upon to do so other courts have employed similar sophistry to get around an unpopular rule of law. In a Pennsylvania case,
Hotz's Estate,6 the testator gave $5,000 to his executors in trust
and ordered them to pay the interest "'.

.

. unto my daughter-in-law,

(Mary K.) Hotz, wife of my son Peter, if she shall then be living, and
the wife or widow of my said son, for her sole or separate use, upon
her own receipt, for and during all the time she shall continue the
wife or widow of my said son.

.

.' " The court said that it was obvious

that the testator .meant to give his daugther-in-law a limited estate
(until she no longer remains his son's widow) and not a larger estate
subject to the condition that she should not remarry.
4

69 Ind. 474 (1880).

5 58 Ind. 207 (1877).
(1886).

See, also, Summit v. Yount, 109 Ind. 506, 9 N. E. 582

6 38 Pa. St. 422, 80 Am. Dec. 490 (1861).

NOTES
In Shaw v. Shaw 7 a testator devised the residue of his estate to his
wife, so long as she remained his widow and then two-thirds of what
was left was to go to testator's heirs..The court held that the wife
did not take the fee in the property, but only an estate subject to her
subsequent marriage. A Connecticut case, Bennett v. Packer,8 has construed a similar devise in the same manner.
One more question naturally presents itself: What importance is to
be attached to the intention of the testator? It does not seem to have
much significance. In practically every case the intention of the testator
is the same: To provide for his wife until she remarries and no longer.
The courts are not controlled by this intention but by an arbitrary
construction of phrases in which that intention is couched. A Virginia
case, Meek v. Fox," has expressed this view in the following words:
"The great weight of authority is to the effect that conditions annexed
to a bequest or a devise, the tendency of which is unduly to restrict
or restrain marriage, are contrary to public policy and void, and it
must be conceded that the intention of the testator in making the
condition is immaterial, however praiseworthy that intent may have
been."
We have seen that the validity of a condition subsequent depends
on its reasonableness. What is reasonable is, of course, a matter of
fact and no hard and fast rule for its determination can be laid down.
Courts have generally held that a condition in general restraint
of marriage is unreasonable.' 0 Thus a provision restraining the devisee,
an unmarried person, from marrying at all has been held to be unreasonable and void, and the title of the donee was not divested upon
her subsequent marriage."
In Pkillipps v. Fergerson12 the following devise was held to be a
reasonable restraint and, therefore, a valid condition: "'If either one
of my children [unmarried] above named in my will should marry in
T. W. Phillips' family, I only give him or her the sum of $3, to be
their part, and to be all that him or her is to receive under the will,
and the foregoing clase of this will that leaves them anything to.be
revoked, and all other portions of this will that provides for same
child.' "
A devise made on condition that the devisee shall not marry until
he or she attains a certain age has been held not to be an unreasonable
7

115 Iowa 193, 88 N. W. 327 (1901).

73 Conn. 72, 39 AtI. 739, 66 Am. St. Rep. 112 (1898).
9 Meek v. Fox, 118 Va. 774, 88 S. E. 161, L. R. A. 1916 D, 1194 (1916).
10 Crawford v. Thompson, 91 Ind. 266, 46 Am. Rep. 598 (1883); Bostick v.
Blades, 59 Md. 231, 43 Am. Rep. 281 (1883).
11 Williams v. Cowden 13 Mo. 211, 53 Am. Dec. 143 (1850).
12 85 Va. 509, 8 S. E. 241, 1 L. R. A. 837 (1888).
8

